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Arbitrating Ballot Battles? 
 
Rebecca Green1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This short article posits that arbitration is an under-explored mechanism for 
resolving post-election disputes. As Professor Edward Foley documents in Ballot 
Battles: The History of Disputed Elections in the United States (“Ballot Battles”), 
post-election disputes have brought state and federal government to a political 
precipice numerous times in our history.2 A comprehensive, transparent, and fair 
arbitration process could well save us from another. 
In 2011, the Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution published papers from a 
symposium on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in election 
disputes. 3  At the symposium, eminent ADR scholars such as Carrie Menkel 
Meadow—a vocal proponent of expanded remedial imagination in designing 
dispute resolution mechanisms—and prominent election attorneys like Marc Elias 
and Ben Ginsberg argued that the binary, “win-lose”4 nature of election disputes 
raised significant barriers to using techniques like mediation to resolve them. 
Several symposium papers (including my own) detailed these challenges but tried to 
suggest ways in which ADR principles and processes might help improve the 
resolution of election disputes.5   
The present effort elaborates on this previous work, written with the benefit of 
Ballot Battles to provide historical sweep to the argument. Professor Foley’s history 
reveals that the judiciary has often proven poorly suited to resolve disputed 
elections.6 Here I will argue that Foley’s solution, a more structured approach of 
specialized election courts, 7  may be augmented by pre-election arbitration 
                                                 
1 Professor of Practice, William & Mary Law School. Professor Green teaches courses in Election 
Law, Alternative Dispute Resolution, and Privacy Law. 
2 EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES (2016). 
3  Symposium, Talking the Vote: Facilitating Disputed Election Processes Through 
ADR, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 281–442 (2012). 
4 Carrie Menkel Meadow, Scaling Up Deliberative Democracy as Dispute Resolution in Healthcare 
Reform: A Work in Progress, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 2, 6 (2011).  
5 Rebecca Green, Mediation and Post-Election Litigation: A Way Forward, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 325, 325–26, 341–52 (2012) (arguing that procedural, as opposed to outcome-
determinative, disputes in the post-election context might usefully be mediated); see also Joshua A. 
Douglas, Election Law and Civil Discourse: The Promise of ADR, 27 OHIO STATE J. OF DISP. 
RESOL. 291, 292–93, 308–19 (2012). 
6 See generally FOLEY, supra note 2. 
7 Professor Foley has been working with the American Law Institute to put his solution into 
practice. For a concrete example of his solution, see PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ELECTION 
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agreements that could infuse greater fairness, predictability, and finality when 
election outcomes are uncertain. 
This article proceeds in four parts. First is a review of the shortcomings of the 
judiciary in resolving ballot-counting disputes. Second is a brief description of the 
main features of modern arbitration. Third is a discussion of how arbitration might 
be used to resolve ballot-counting disputes. And last is a review of a few possible 
critiques of the proposal to arbitrate ballot battles. 
 
I. THE PROBLEM WITH COURTS RESOLVING BALLOT COUNTING DISPUTES 
 
We need look no further than the taint on the U.S. Supreme Court after its 
decision in Bush v. Gore to see the risk of embroiling the judiciary in ballot-
counting disputes. 8  For good reason, the U.S. Constitution established an 
independent judiciary to ensure the public perception of a judicial system free from 
partisan tilt. The potential of embroiling the judiciary in political mire is arguably 
at its peak when election outcomes are in dispute.  
These fears drove the Supreme Court to deem non-justiciable election-related 
battles in cases ranging from redistricting9 to post-election disputes10 throughout 
most of this country’s history. For ballot-counting disputes specifically, the 
Supreme Court case Taylor v. Beckham established in 1900 the principle that 
federal courts lacked power to address state ballot-counting disputes.11 As Foley 
documents, it was not until the Warren Court in the 1960s that the federal 
judiciary entered the political thicket.12 
For their part, state courts, when called upon to resolve post-election 
controversies, very often emerged with partisan stain, particularly in cases in which 
rulings fell along partisan lines. 13  Indeed, state court outcomes have too often 
                                                                                                                 
ADMINISTRATION: NON-PRECINCT VOTING AND RESOLUTION OF BALLOT-COUNTING DISPUTES 
§ 304 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 2, 2015). 
8 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157 (2000)(“[A]bove all, in this highly politicized matter, the 
appearance of a split decision runs the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the Court itself. 
That confidence is a public treasure….”); See also, Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial 
Impartiality and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606 (2002)(discussing the taint 
on the judiciary wrought by Bush v. Gore); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping 
vs. Balancing in the Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on the High Court, 
17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 507, 535 (2008)(noting the threat to the Court’s impartiality resulting 
from Bush v. Gore). 
9 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
10 Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900). 
11 Id. at 580–81. 
12 See FOLEY, supra note 2, at 233–37 (stating that courts began to apply this judicial philosophy in 
the post-election ballot counting context in the following cases: Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978); Roe v. Alabama, 
43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995)).   
13 See, e.g., id. at 122 (providing that the 2-1 determinations of the Florida Canvassing Board in 
1876, and, much more recently, the 5-4 ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush, 531 U.S. 98, show 
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exposed partisan preference at the cost of neutrality and sound judicial reasoning. 
Examples include New York’s “Stolen Senate” in 1891, embroiling the state’s 
judiciary in manipulating electoral results; 14  the all-Democrat Rhode Island 
Supreme Court’s perpetration of a partisan denial of the majority of Rhode Island 
voters’ will in its 1956 gubernatorial election; 15  and the 1994 election for the 
Alabama Chief Justice wherein “renegade jurists even had the chutzpah to proclaim 
the ballots valid despite the explicit language of state law that provided 
otherwise.” 16  As Professor Foley shows us, American history is replete with 
examples of partisan state courts acting in a partisan manner, despite evidence and 
law pointing to the contrary. 
Despite this troubling history, state and federal judiciaries are the current go-to 
institutions for resolving election disputes. Yet the temptation for judges to advance 
political interests has often proved too great. There have, of course, been many 
examples of pivotally neutral judges in election disputes.17 Carefully selected judicial 
panels have at times produced legitimate and admirable outcomes, as in the case of 
the 2008 Minnesota U.S. Senate recount discussed below.18 
The core problem with delegating post-election dispute resolutions to courts, 
however, is that we cannot know in advance whether particular judges will act in a 
partisan or neutral manner. Judges—with their experiences and stature—may make 
the obvious best choice as a category to resolve election disputes. But individual 
judges are not always well suited to the task of resolving election-related disputes. 
Judges develop reputations based on who appointed them or behavior and 
statements during judicial campaigns (in states with judicial elections). Judges’ 
political leanings are often discernable from decisions they issue from the bench.  
Post-election litigation is like lightning; you never know where or when it is 
going to strike. Because of the impossibility of prediction, it is difficult to know in 
advance whether judges hearing post-election disputes will be impartial and—most 
critically—be someone the public perceives as politically neutral and fair-minded. 
Widely respected and impartial judges exist at the federal and state level, of 
course.19 Yet it is difficult ex ante to choose an appropriate judicial institution or 
officer to resolve an election dispute if the goal is to ensure a result the public does 
not perceive as partisan. 
                                                                                                                 
the result of state court rulings concerning post-election controversies). 
14 Id. at 188–90. 
15 Id. at 230–31. 
16 Id. at 258. 
17  Id. at 228–29 (providing numerous examples of “partisan” courts delivering decidedly non-
partisan rulings throughout; for example, the Missouri Supreme Court’s refusal to delay the 
inauguration of a Republican Governor after a close election showed the Democrat trailing by only 
4,000 votes, despite the all-Democrat slate of judges on the court at the time). 
18 Id. at 242, 325–27, 333. 
19 See id. at 233–34, 236, 242, 325–27, 333. 
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Furthermore, candidates challenging the outcome of an election can make the 
problem worse by looking to the partisan makeup of institutions in the path to 
resolution and hopscotching to ones most likely to lean in their political favor. 
Professor Foley recounts numerous examples of forum shopping in Ballot Battles 
where savvy candidates looked for decision makers already on their side to resolve 
disputed elections. 20 To the extent courts then became involved, left in the wake is 
a judiciary mired in the thicket. 
In Ballot Battles, Professor Foley nevertheless suggests that the judiciary is the 
best home for post-election dispute resolution.21 He bases this claim largely on 
disqualifying the obvious alternatives. He carefully documents, for example, how 
sending post-election disputes into the political den of wolves that is a state or 
federal legislature for resolution has throughout U.S. history proven calamitous.22 
The other alternative Foley recounts, violence, is similarly far from attractive.23 For 
Foley, this leaves the courts—and in his view particularly the federal courts—as the 
“least-worst” alternative. While federal courts are likely the “least-worst” option, 
Foley acknowledges that better than bad should never be the goal. As such, he 
advocates in Ballot Battles and elsewhere for the establishment of a quasi-judicial 
impartial tribunal that would either be a creature of state statute, federal statute, or 
even constitutional amendment to resolve post-election ballot battles.24  
                                                 
20 See, e.g., id. at 206–17 (explaining the Ballot Box 13 controversy during future President Lyndon 
Johnson’s 87-vote electoral win over Coke Stevenson in the primary election for the U.S. Senate in 
1948, and describing the legal strategy necessitating candidates choosing forums that might hear their 
side favorably); id. at 217 (explaining Nixon’s strategy in 1960, where despite a close outcome in Texas 
Nixon chose not to pursue a recount in Texas because of, inter alia, Johnson’s control of the state 
judiciary at the time); id. at 267–68 (giving another example occurred in the 1994 Alabama Chief Justice 
election where both candidates looked for favorable judges to hear their claims); see also id. at 313 
(accounting of the 2004 Washington gubernatorial election dispute); id. at 293–98 (providing that the 
litigation strategy for both sides in Bush v. Gore provides a modern example). 
21 Id. at 97 (discussing historian Tracy Campbell’s praise of using the judiciary to resolve election 
disputes in Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567 (1856)). 
22 Id. at 249–51 (comparing U.S. Senate battles settled by states to those settled by the U.S. Senate 
concluding that “[s]imply put, the step of taking a dispute to the Senate escalated the contentiousness 
and prolonged the controversy.”). 
23 Id. at 112–13 (explaining that U.S. history reveals multiple instances in which electoral disputes 
were resolved with violence (or threat of violence) including, for example, the Colfax Massacre in 1872 
in Louisiana (in which a Reconstruction-era ballot dispute led to the slaughter of more than a hundred 
African Americans who had sought refuge from violence in a local courthouse)).  
24 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: NON-PRECINCT VOTING AND 
RESOLUTION OF BALLOT-COUNTING DISPUTES § 304, at 33–47 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft 
No. 2, 2015); see also Steven F. Huefner & Edward B. Foley, The Judicialization of Politics, 79 
BROOK. L. REV. 551, 551 (2014) (describing the ALI Project approach); Edward B. Foley, How Fair 
Can be Faster: The Lessons of Coleman v. Franken, 10 ELECTION L.J. 187, 190 (2011) (proposing the 
creation of State Election Review Tribunals); Edward B. Foley, The McCain v. Obama Simulation: A 
Fair Tribunal for Dispute Presidential Elections, N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 471, 477–78 (2010) 
[hereinafter Foley, McCain v. Obama Simulation] (describing the creation of a special tribunal for a 
mock disputed presidential election exercise). See generally Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in 
Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J. 1 (2013). Note that several state statutes require convening specialized 
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To further this idea, Professor Foley has been working with the American Law 
Institute (ALI) to develop model rules for the resolution of disputed presidential 
elections (hereinafter the “ALI Project”).25 On the question of forum selection, the 
ALI Project proposes that the chief justice of the state supreme court in the state 
with a disputed outcome appoint a three-judge tribunal to hear the dispute. 26 
Under this model, the state vests this “Presidential Election Court” with the power 
to enter orders like any other court and set subsidiary deadlines and rules to govern 
the process.27 Professor Foley’s ideas represent a giant and important step forward. 
As he counsels, resorting to blind hope that a given court will handle ballot 
disputes effectively should not be the continued course. The next section reviews 
features of arbitration suggesting it might offer helpful embellishments to the 
model Foley proposes. 
 
II. ARBITRATION: ATTRACTIVE FEATURES 
 
As many in the business world can attest, arbitration is often preferable to 
litigation. In the case of a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate, agreement is reached 
when temperaments are calm and, critically, when parties have no way of knowing 
which procedural decisions will benefit which party. Below is a description of some 
of the advantages of arbitration, with an emphasis on those that might be of 
particular benefit in ballot-counting disputes. 
 
A. Contractual Flexibility 
 
The single biggest advantage of arbitration and the reason it is used so often is 
flexibility.28 Arbitration is a creature of contract.29 There are therefore as many ways 
                                                                                                                 
courts to resolve election disputes. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §60.1 (West, Westlaw through end of 
the 2015 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-1437, 25-1443 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-203 (West, Westlaw through ch. 1 to 6 of the  2016 Reg. 
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. 16.1-14-07 (West, Westlaw through ch. 484 
(end) of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 64th Legis. Assemb.); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-805 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
25 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: NON-PRECINCT VOTING AND 
RESOLUTION OF BALLOT-COUNTING DISPUTES § 304 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 2, 
2015). 
26 Id. cmt b. 
27 Id. cmts. 
28  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau recently issued a report including data on the 
prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. The document reports that “[t]ens of millions of 
consumers use consumer financial products or services that are subject to pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses.” CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 
1028(A) 9 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-
congress-2015.pdf. 
29 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 561, 570–71 (1960)(“To be 
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to structure arbitration as are within the imagination of the parties drawing up the 
agreement to arbitrate. Arbitration agreements can range from deciding to resolve 
any future dispute with the flip a coin 30  to complex hundred-page arbitration 
clauses addressing every possible contingency.  
Parties can draft an arbitration contract well in advance of a dispute arising or 
they can write an agreement to arbitrate after a dispute has arisen. Parties can agree 
upon who they would like to resolve their dispute or they can agree on a process by 
which an arbitrator (or a panel of arbitrators) will be selected if a dispute arises. 
Parties can map out the scope of the dispute to be resolved in the arbitral forum, 
leaving other parts to courts. Or, parties can require that all related matters be 
heard in a single arbitral forum. Parties can stipulate in their agreement to arbitrate 
rules governing discovery and procedure to suit their needs. Parties can require that 
disputes be submitted to binding arbitration (meaning appeal is not possible) or 
non-binding arbitration (leaving avenues of appeal open).31 
A fundamental underpinning of arbitration is freedom of contract. Thanks to 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), passed in 1925, state governments and courts 
must respect this freedom of contract by honoring the parties’ chosen means of 
resolving their dispute.32 
 
B. Selection of Neutrals 
                                                                                                                 
sure, since arbitration is a creature of contract, a court must always inquire, when a party seeks to invoke 
its aid to force a reluctant party to the arbitration table, whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate the 
particular dispute.”); Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 194 (3d Cir. 2010) (“As we have 
stressed, ‘[a]rbitration is fundamentally a creature of contract, and an arbitrator's authority is derived 
from an agreement to arbitrate.”’ (quoting Allstate Settlement Corp. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 559 
F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
30 Cf. Russell Berman, Was the Iowa Caucus Decided by Coin Flips?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 2016) 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/hillary-clinton-bernie-sanders-coin-flips-iowa-
caucus/459429/ (noting that coin flips are no stranger in election dispute resolution describing dead-
heat Iowa caucus outcomes decided by coin flips). 
31 See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, Non-Binding Arbitration: An Introduction, DISP. RESOL. J., May-
July 2006, at 22, 24 (discussing the benefits of non-binding arbitration including providing “the parties 
with important information about how a knowledgeable fact finder might decide the case”). 
32 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2011). The period before Congress passed the FAA 
was marked by a judicial reluctance to honor arbitrated outcomes. The judiciary was suspicious that 
arbitrators could mete out justice fairly, and protective of courts’ role in protecting litigants’ rights. 
Congress passed the FAA at the behest of business interests anxious to enjoy the many benefits of 
arbitration (efficiency, cost, control, and the ability to pick neutrals familiar with industry norms) 
without the judiciary stepping in to undercut its effectiveness. See William F. Kolakowski III, Note, 
The Federal Arbitration Act and Individual Employment Contracts: A Better Means to an Equally Just 
End, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2171, 2187 (1995) (asserting that by enacting the FAA, Congress intended “to 
override a longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,” “to place agreements to arbitrate on 
an equal footing with other contract provisions,” and “to provide for more speedy and cost-effective 
adjudication”); see also Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous 
Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and A Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 796–97, 799–
800 (2002). 
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Another attractive feature of arbitration is that disputing parties control who 
will arbitrate their dispute. Disputing parties may agree on arbitrator(s) by name or 
a process of selection. Giving disputants the ability to select arbitrators—whether 
sitting or retired judges or individuals who are not members of the judiciary but 
command the requisite respect or expertise—offers flexibility and the nimble 
approach many disputes require.  
As the use of arbitration has expanded in the United States and internationally, 
associations of arbitrators have developed, such as the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) 33  and the Judicial Arbitration and Medication Service 
(JAMS). 34  Both organizations refer parties to lists of qualified arbitration 
professionals (many of whom are retired judges). Such organizations also offer 
industry-specific form arbitration clauses drawn from the experience of arbitrating 
thousands of disputes.35 Arbitration entities have even developed their own set of 
procedural rules contracting parties can choose to adopt in their arbitration 
agreements.36 Such arbitration organizations base their model on achieving a strong 
reputation; they maintain a strong interest in carefully vetting arbitrators they refer 
and procedural rules they use.37 Parties who turn to organizations like the AAA 
have the benefit of the legitimacy these organizations have built, lending credibility 
to their choice of arbitrator and the ensuing arbitration itself. 
 
 
 
                                                 
33  About the JAMS Name, JAMS: RESOLVING DISPUTES WORLDWIDE, 
https://www.jamsadr.com/about-the-jams-name/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). 
34 About the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the International Centre for Dispute 
Resolution (ICDR), AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about;jsessionid 
=Pr3ISI-Nb8pZbVeBIRYDteaXms-felqQFeUMP1QeSatXt7WIYG!1802314859?_afrLoop=5577 
99250948298&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrL
oop%3D557799250948298%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dop2375euk_4 (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2016). At one point in Ballot Battles, Professor Foley suggests that “a neutral body 
chosen from a panel recommended by the American Arbitration Association” might make sense in post-
election cases. FOLEY, supra note 2, at 252. 
35 Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses: A Practical Guide, AM. ARB. ASS'N  (Oct. 1, 2013), 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_002540 [hereinafter Drafting Dispute Resolution 
Clauses]. 
36  See, e.g., Most Commonly Viewed Rules, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/searchrules?_afrLoop=2089530886743069&_afrWindowMode=0&
_afrWindowId=14v4wumyrm_1#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3D14v4wumyrm_1%26_afrLoop%3D20895
30886743069%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D14v4wumyrm_55 (last visited Nov. 
28, 2016). 
37 See Qualification Criteria of the AAA/ICDR Rosters and Panels, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/arbitratorsmediators/aboutarbitratorsmediators/qualifications?_afrLoop=
559390262288235&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=op2375euk_77#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3
Dop2375euk_77%26_afrLoop%3D559390262288235%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-
state%3Dop2375euk_149 (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). 
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C. Finality 
 
Another enormous benefit of arbitration is finality. Especially in commercial 
disputes, agreeing to arbitrate saves businesses time and money and avoids the 
uncertainty of protracted litigation. 38  Thanks to the FAA and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence since its passage, arbitral awards command the respect of courts. 
Citing the FAA, courts almost never pierce the arbitration veil to review arbitral 
decisions.39 The finality of arbitration helps businesses keep dispute resolution costs 
manageable and infinitely more predictable. Even though arbitration has come 
under fire recently in the consumer and employment contexts, courts regularly cite 
the congressional imperative that arbitral decisions be final, allowing very limited 
grounds for overturning an arbitrated result.40 
But finality need not necessarily be a feature of arbitration. Contracting parties 
are free to elect non-binding arbitration allowing the losing party to seek appeal or 
resort to filing a claim in court. Contracting parties can and often do contract for a 
dispute resolution process that includes a series of steps. 41  Parties might, for 
example, agree to mediate their claim first before turning to arbitration. Parties 
                                                 
38 Cf. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70 (2010) (holding that a provision of 
employment agreement delegating exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the agreement's 
enforceability to an arbitrator was a valid delegation under the FAA); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443, 447 (2006) (holding that claim that purportedly usurious contract 
containing an arbitration provision was void for illegality was to be determined by arbitrator, not court). 
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to uphold agreements to arbitrate (“A written 
provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”). 9 
U.S.C. § 2 (2014). Arbitration can lead to litigation when the agreement to arbitrate is challenged. 
However, the Supreme Court has held that so-called “gateway” issue of contract formation must be 
decided within the arbitral forum. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., 561 U.S. at 68–72. Because of the FAA, 
a carefully crafted agreement to arbitrate is less prone to wind up in protracted litigation than a dispute 
in court, supplying the reason that it is the favored option of efficiency-craving actors in the commercial 
context. 
39 But see Roger B. Jacobs, Examining the Elusiveness of Finality in Arbitration, and the New 
Avenues of Appeal, 33 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 4 (2015) (arguing that arbitration 
associations like AAA and JAMS are incorporating appellate processes into their procedural rules that 
are doing harm to the finality principle in arbitration). 
40 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4) (2014) (permitting a court to vacate an arbitral award upon finding of 
corruption, fraud, or impartiality of arbitrators, arbitrator misconduct, or instances where arbitrators 
have exceeded the scope of the authority given them under the agreement to arbitrate); see also St. 
John's Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Delfino, 414 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that there is a “strong 
federal policy favoring certainty and finality in arbitration”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc. v. Berry, 92 F. App'x 243, 246 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is clear that the FAA reflects Congressional 
approval of the speed and finality of arbitration . . . .”); Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, 
International Private Commercial Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business 
People, 30 INT'L BUS. LAW 203, 204 (2002) (noting that 32% of arbitration participants surveyed cited 
“finality” as one of their top three reasons for arbitrating their dispute). 
41 See Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses, supra note 34, at 13. 
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might contract for a “mini-trial,” or document exchange before proceeding to a 
formalized procedure. Parties can also contract to have arbitrated outcomes 
reviewed by a court.42 
In sum, arbitration finality is defined by its lack of definition—parties can 
create a process designed to resolve the dispute as efficiently and with as much 
finality as desired. 
 
D. Confidentiality 
 
A further reason why arbitration is often an attractive option for would-be 
litigants is confidentiality. Unlike resolving disputes in open court, arbitration 
allows parties to contract for the confidential resolution of their dispute. In the age 
of the Internet when jammy-surfers can call up the most salacious details of a court 
case from their living rooms, the attractiveness of confidential arbitration 
proceeding cannot be understated.43  
Still, just because most arbitration is conducted confidentially, it need not be so. 
Because arbitration is a creature of contract, parties can contract for as transparent a 
process as they would like. If they choose, parties are free to bake in transparency 
protections to ensure that the public has a means of assessing arbitration processes 
and outcomes.44 
 
                                                 
42 Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration 
Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 455, 455–56 n.95 (2010) (describing how 
“sophisticated parties have . . . tried to mitigate the problem of uncorrectable errors in high-dollar cases 
by using arbitration clauses that require courts to review arbitration awards much the way appellate 
courts review trial courts”); see also Carroll E. Neesemann, Contracting for Judicial Review: Party-
Chosen Arbitral Review Standards Can Inspire Confidence in the Profess, and is Good for Arbitration, 
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1998, at 18, 18–19. But see Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 
576, 584 (2008) (holding that the FAA grounds for vacatur or modification are exclusive and cannot be 
expanded by the parties' agreement); Michael S. Oberman, ‘The Other Shoe': Are Agreements 
Narrowing Judicial Review Enforceable?, 31 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 65, 65 (2013) 
(explaining that in Hall Street the Court “held open the possibility that broader review might be 
available under state law”). 
43 See generally Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2013) (explaining the heightened privacy interests at stake when case records 
are available in a searchable computer database). But see Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Federalization of 
Consumer Arbitration: Possible Solutions, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 271, 312–13 (2013) (noting that, 
particularly in the consumer arbitration context, unless the parties sign a confidentiality agreement or 
language is included in the agreement to arbitrate, arbitration is not necessarily confidential). See also 
Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age of 
Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 314–15 (2004)(“[A]s our legal system undergoes the 
transformation to a system of electronic judicial records--with all its substantial benefits--it is critical to 
ask how the advantages of public access are to be balanced against the other competing policies that 
have served to limit access in the past, such as … protecting individuals from invasion of their privacy 
and misuse of their personal information.”). 
44 Cole, supra note 42, at 313. 
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III. ARBITRATING POST-ELECTION DISPUTES 
 
Imagine this: after candidates have qualified for a state ballot in an upcoming 
election, the state requires the candidates to sign an agreement to submit any 
disputes arising from the counting of ballots in that election to arbitration. The 
state might structure such a contract to allow the candidates to negotiate the 
specific terms of the agreement,45 or the terms might be set by state statute or by 
the state’s elections board. As another alternative, the agreement might include a 
combination: portions that the candidates can negotiate and portions they cannot.46 
For example, the structure might permit candidates to negotiate only the process 
for forming the arbitral panel or list names of arbitrators the candidates agree upon 
in advance. The agreement to arbitrate might also include language that binds the 
candidates to certain timelines, cost structures, ballot-counting standards, and/or 
procedural rules. The agreement might be mandatory, imposed on all candidates as 
a condition of access to the ballot; or it might be voluntary and aspirational in 
nature.47 The agreement might contemplate that the arbitral decision be judicially 
reviewable; or the parties could agree that all decisions emanating from the arbitral 
forum are final and non-reviewable. The discussion that follows elaborates on some 
of the key features such an agreement might include. 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Any agreement to arbitrate must comport with the U.S. Constitution and with federal and state 
statutory provisions regarding the resolution of election disputes. The arbitration scheme proposed 
herein could therefore only function if Congress and state legislatures delegated authority to arbitrate 
election disputes via statute. Such a scheme is not without precedent. For example, Virginia delegates 
authority to resolve certain election disputes to an appointed Election Court. See VA. CODE ANN. § 
24.2-801.1 (LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assembly) (“As soon as a petition [for recount 
of presidential electors] is filed, the chief judge of the Circuit Court shall promptly notify the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia, who shall designate two other judges to sit with the chief 
judge, and the court shall be constituted and sit in all respects as a court appointed and sitting under § 
24.2-805.”). 
46 Anyone who is familiar with candidate negotiations over debate rules may wonder whether it is 
feasible/possible for adversarial candidates to agree on a dispute resolution process during the course of a 
heated political campaign. Still when faced with the uncertainties of (1) a post-election dispute arising at 
all and (2) what unknown processes they might be subject to should they arise, candidates might be 
sufficiently motivated to set procedures and rules in advance. In addition, once arbitral agreements 
become the norm, a set agreement might emerge that would reduce the need for negotiation of every 
aspect. 
47 It is possible that a candidate could challenge conditioning access to the ballot on signing an 
agreement to arbitrate. Given that many public sector employees are bound by arbitration clauses in 
their employment contracts, it is hard to see how a state could lack the power to bind candidates in this 
context. Laura J. Cooper, Discipline and Discharge of Public-Sector Employees: An Empirical Study of 
Arbitration Awards, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 195, 201 (2012) (evaluating the use of arbitration in 
public sector employee contracts). To the degree that candidates are able to negotiate ex ante for desired 
features of the arbitral forum, conditioning access seems reasonable. 
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A. Parties to a Pre-Election Agreement to Arbitrate 
 
A threshold question is who exactly the parties to the agreement to arbitrate 
should be. Although the candidates are obvious signatories, many others are 
impacted by the outcome of a contested election including state and national 
political parties and, to an even greater extent, voters. Would an agreement among 
the candidates to arbitrate post-election disputes adequately represent the public 
interest?48 Would candidates’ interests substantially diverge from voters’ interests?  
In some respects candidate and voter interests are one and the same. To the 
extent that candidates advocate for their own voters and against their opponents’, 
the interests of all voters are represented. This is the model that post-election 
litigation largely relies upon. Would an arbitral forum provide the same voter 
representation? There is no reason to think it would not. And indeed, there is every 
hope that a pre-election agreement to arbitrate would improve upon the litigation 
model. First, unlike a post-election litigated process, an agreement to arbitrate 
could affirmatively incorporate protections for voter and other stakeholder interests 
well before Election Day when all sides are committed to a fair outcome. Further, 
arbitration is not limited to including only dueling candidates. Agreements to 
arbitrate could also include state officials, such as the state’s chief election officer 
and/or attorney general. State and local party representatives could also sign the 
agreement. A potential downside is that more contracting parties are added, the 
more complicated arbitral contract negotiations might become. But, the resulting 
agreement to arbitrate would—if well crafted—arguably subject any future dispute 
to greater buy-in than a litigated process. 
A benefit of arbitration is that a one-size-fits all solution is not required. States 
could decide which parties should enter the agreement depending on the type of 
election at issue and the players involved. This approach could complement the 
Presidential Election Court model Professor Foley proposes.49  
 
B. Choice of Arbitrator(s) 
 
Choosing an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators to hear post-election ballot-
counting disputes presents a difficult challenge. Even a panel designed to prevent 
partisan leaning can wind up politically lopsided. A perfect example is the 
commission established to resolve the Tilden-Hayes ballot battle in 1876.50 The 
panel delegated authority to resolve the dispute consisted of fifteen individuals: five 
senators, five representatives, and five members of the Supreme Court.51 The ten 
                                                 
48 See Green, supra note 5, at 360–62 (discussing incorporating public interest in dispute resolution 
contexts). 
49 Foley, McCain v. Obama Simulation, supra note 24, at 479–80. 
50 FOLEY, supra note 2, at 125–31. 
51 Id. at 130. 
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members from Congress were known to split evenly along partisan lines.52 Of the 
five U.S. Supreme Court justices on commission, two were Republican-appointed 
and two were Democrat-appointed. Those four justices were to choose a fifth 
justice, ideally seen as impartial, to act in the tiebreaker role for the whole 
otherwise evenly-divided commission.53 The chosen justice, Justice David Davis 
(widely regarded as an impartial voice on the Court), however, declined to serve.54 
Instead, the four justices opted for a second choice, Justice Joseph Bradley, whom 
Foley describes as holding widely acknowledged Republican leanings. 55  This 
example suggests caution, as it illustrates how difficult it can be to appoint a true 
neutral. 
As Professor Foley suggests, certain people throughout history have been 
invested with the gravitas and public trust to resolve election disputes in a manner 
the public is prepared to accept. Ballot battles have very often been resolved not due 
to institutional fortitude or the rule of law, but because the right person at the right 
time stepped up to help bring disputes to resolution. Famous examples include 
Senator Thomas Ferry of Michigan and Speaker Samuel Randall in the Hayes-
Tilden recount, Joshua Chamberlain’s work to resolve Maine elections in 1879, and 
the many other examples peppered throughout Professor Foley’s book.56 
It is virtually impossible to identify such a person in the abstract, or indeed, for 
a legislature to craft a post-election dispute resolution process via statute that could 
identify the right people willing and available at some future possible point down 
the road. History shows us that it is not impossible to find such people, however, 
when a specific election dispute is at hand. 
In 1962, Minnesota’s gubernatorial race came down to a victory of only 91 
votes, a .0073% lead.57  To resolve the outcome of the election, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court put in place a special election tribunal—with agreement from both 
candidates—to adjudicate the contest. 58  The Chief Justice of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court “let it be known that he wanted the two candidates to agree on a 
neutral judge to hear the contest.”59 As Foley describes it:  
 
The attorneys for the two candidates then developed a plan whereby the contest 
would be considered by a three-judge trial court. The attorneys picked the three 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 130–31. 
54 Id. at 131–32. 
55 Id. at 132. 
56  Id. at 317–18 (describing how “Secretary of State Sam Reed had behaved impartially, and 
admirably, throughout” the 2004 Washington gubernatorial recount); id. at 167 (“Chamberlin was 
revered throughout the state—and the nation—for heroism during the Civil War . . . . Although he had 
been a Republican governor in the state, he was one man capable of standing above the partisan fray.”) 
57 Id. at 238. 
58 See id. at 240-242. 
59 Id. (quoting RONALD F. STINNETT & CHARLES H. BACKSTROM, RECOUNT 95 (Washington, 
DC: Document Publishers, 1964). 
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judges they wanted for this panel: one appointed by a Democrat . . . another 
appointed by a Republican . . . , and a third who had been originally appointed by 
a Democrat but who had been elevated to a higher court by a Republican. By 
choosing these three judges, both sides thought that they had adequate 
representation on the panel and, at the same time, that the panel was evenhanded 
and balanced despite having an odd number of members. The chief justice readily 
signed an order giving jurisdiction over the contest case to the three-judge panel 
and the two sides had selected.60 
 
In Ballot Battles and elsewhere, the Minnesota solution has been widely praised 
as a model approach to resolving post-election disputes. 61 In ceding authority to 
the parties to select arbiters, the model closely resembles a form of post-dispute 
agreement to arbitrate, here blessed by the state’s highest judicial official.62 Foley 
also describes other instances in which states employed creative approaches to 
resolve election disputes.63  
Can such an approach be planned ahead of time, before ballots have even been 
cast? The ALI Project endeavors to achieve this end in the case of a disputed 
presidential election by vesting authority in the chief justice of the state supreme 
court to identify three individuals to serve on the tribunal the Project proposes.64  
Within the Reporter’s Note, the ALI expresses hope that the “basic idea of ‘fair 
play’ imbedded in American culture would cause the Chief Justice to exercise this 
appointment authority in a[n] . . . evenhanded manner.”65 The ALI model thus 
engages in a bit of wishful thinking that such an approach would most likely play 
out in favor of fairness.  
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 333. Observers widely praised the recount outcome as “determined according to impartial 
law, not partisan favor.” Id. (quoting a Minneapolis Star Tribune article). 
62 See id. at 242. Note that Minnesota followed its model again successfully in the 2008 Coleman-
Franken recount where Justice Page (acting for the recused Chief Justice according to Minnesota law) 
carefully empaneled a “tripartisan” panel to hear the recount. Id. at 325–27. In ceding authority to the 
parties, the model closely resembles a form of post-dispute agreement to arbitrate, which had been 
blessed by the state's highest judicial official. However, that official still retained the right to select a 
panel of judges if the situation made it necessary for the judge to choose. 
63 See id. at 247, 253, 270. (Foley explains how a number of states’ have resolved election disputes 
in similar ways). For example, Foley includes a description of a New Jersey recount in 1981 that 
employed method similar to Minnesota’s using recount rules jointly drafted by attorneys from both 
campaigns. Id. at 247. Oklahoma law required the two candidates to agree upon a judge to adjudicate a 
dispute in a U.S. Senate election in 1974 with review by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Id. at 253. 
Future U.S. Senator Jeff Sessions who, while serving as Alabama Attorney General, proposed the 
creation of a “special ‘bipartsian court’ to hear [an election dispute in that state].” Id. at 270. 
64  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: NON-PRECINCT VOTING AND 
RESOLUTION OF BALLOT-COUNTING DISPUTES § 304(a) (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 2, 
2015). (“Within 24 hours of the Chief Election Officer’s declaration pursuant to §303 [Declaration of 
Expedited Presidential Recount] the Chief Justice publicly shall either (1) announce the appointment of 
three judges to serve as the Presidential Election Court; or (2) if before the election three judges were 
contingently appointed to serve in this capacity, confirm the prior appointment.”). Note that this 
mechanism could work equally well if the prior appointment arises from an agreement to arbitrate. 
65 Id. Reporter’s Note at 40. 
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An arbitration approach would allow a more calibrated approach to identifying 
individuals with the right temperament and reputation to serve as arbitrators of 
ballot-counting disputes.66 A number of different models could be used. Parties 
might decide that each side would submit lists and engage in a process of striking 
names, similar to selection of juries. Or, parties could each be tasked with choosing 
an arbitrator with loyalties to the opposing party (such that moderate individuals 
are chosen) with those two chosen arbitrators choosing a third.67 Or, parties could 
agree that once the dispute arose, they would follow the Minnesota models of each 
choosing one person affiliated with their own party and a third chosen for his or 
her neutral reputation and widespread respect. Parties would not be limited to 
selecting judges (though they could assuming judicial rules regarding participation 
as arbitrators allowed it).68 There are a number of interesting options parties could 
exercise.69 In addition, just as the American Arbitration Association has developed 
a list of respected and trusted arbitrators, one could imagine a list of expert election 
dispute arbitrators developing. The point: arbitration offers a process by which 
creative options for arbitrator selection can be built into an arbitration agreement 
well before a dispute arises.  
 
C. Finality 
 
There can be little doubt that finality, achieved as soon as possible, is favorable 
in post-election disputes. Uncertainty in electoral outcomes has left seats vacant 
well into official terms in examples throughout U.S. history.70 In many cases, the 
failure of an election to seat officials has stalled the legislative process or otherwise 
inhibited government functioning (not to mention the toll it takes on public 
confidence in government). 71  As discussed herein, pre-election arbitration 
agreements have the advantage of allowing parties to set procedural deadlines, limit 
opportunities for appeal, consolidate types of disputes into a single arbitral forum, 
and potentially leverage the unwillingness of courts to vacate arbitral awards to 
solidify and finalize arbitration outcomes. 
But finality in election arbitration would be limited in one important respect. 
Namely, arbitrated outcomes only bind the parties that contracted to arbitrate. An 
                                                 
66  See Foley, The McCain v. Obama Simulation, supra note 24, at 488–89 (discussing the 
considerations behind the choice of judges for the judicial panel, including their qualifications). The 
merits of established arbitrators can be seen by glancing into the complex process required to determine 
a judicial panel. 
67 Id. 
68 Jacobs, supra note 38, at 5. 
69  See Foley, McCain v. Obama Simulation, supra note 24, at 488–89. Professor Foley has 
addressed the selection of appropriate arbiters of election disputes elsewhere. Id. 
70 See FOLEY, supra note 2, at 334 (noting that Senator Al Franken was not seated in the U.S. 
Senate until eight months after election day). 
71 Id. 
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individual voter (or group of voters) is not bound by an arbitration agreement and 
may elect to pursue claims in court.72 Parties in election disputes regularly use this 
tactic to evade an unfavorable state court ruling. 73  
Such end-runs around arbitral forums could be avoided by ensuring that 
procedural protections afforded in the forum are strong. The court-appointed 
tribunal the ALI Project proposes faces a similar challenge. The authors suggest 
that the stronger the protections built into the process, the less vulnerable it is to 
attack under federal law: 
 
[A]n essential component of [the procedures proposed in the ALI Project] is that 
they are designed with the aim of satisfying applicable Fourteenth Amendment 
standards. Thus, if a state employs these Procedures and adheres to them in their 
implementation, the state reasonably should be able to expect that the federal 
judiciary will not interfere with their operation.74 
 
A federal court’s motivation to interfere with a state court outcome on behalf of 
a voter or group of voters is only strong when the state court outcome is perceived 
to lack procedural fairness. As the Reporter’s Note puts it: “[T]he occasion for the 
exercise of those federal powers may diminish, as a state amends its law to put its 
own ballot-counting house in order (so to speak).”75 If the tribunal is a creature 
borne of a thorough and fair agreement to arbitrate, protections against federal 
meddling is arguably heightened.76  
                                                 
72 See Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075–76 (1984) (arguing 
that a disparity in resources among parties can result in unfair settlement outcomes); James M. Hosking, 
The Third Party Non-Signatory’s Ability to Compel International Commercial Arbitration: Doing 
Justice Without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 469 (2004). This question brings up a 
related critique of the ADR model in general. Some argue the ADR model lacks due process protections 
for litigants, which are particularly important when litigation is marked by extreme power imbalances. 
See id. In the case of campaigns, candidates often have war chests of different sizes and costs of recounts 
and other post-election procedures can prove prohibitive. Arbitration agreements can and should seek to 
reduce the problem of disparate resources in election cases in pursuit of a fair outcome. 
73 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: NON-PRECINCT VOTING AND 
RESOLUTION OF BALLOT-COUNTING DISPUTES § 304, Reporter’s Note at 44 (AM. LAW INST., 
Council Draft No. 2, 2015) (citing Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.2d at 580) (noting the defeat of an attempted 
end-run around a state court outcome accomplished by filing a federal court suit in the name of voters 
who were not parties to the state court proceeding at issue). 
74 Id. § 304, cmt. f, at 38. 
75 Id. § 304, Reporter’s Note at 43. 
76 The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions rejected the argument that arbitral forums leave 
federal statutory and constitutional rights unprotected. Citing the national policy favoring arbitration, 
the Supreme Court has regularly blessed arbitration as an adequate means of vindicating such claims. 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The NLRA's Legacy: Collective or Individual Dispute Resolution or Not?, 26 
ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 249, 259 (2011) (citing de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225–26 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (describing the Court’s acceptance of 
the arbitral forum to protect statutory claims)). 
714 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 104 
 
 
As arbitration has evolved, parties have developed mechanisms to incorporate 
due process protections into the arbitral forum. For example, individuals regularly 
involved in the employment dispute arena came together to develop a set of 
contractual norms to ensure that arbitration agreements protected the due process 
rights of parties to arbitration, culminating in the development of the Due Process 
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the 
Employment Relationship.77 Industry-specific procedural rules developed by the 
American Arbitration Association provide another example of the standard-setting 
function arbitration can play.78 Especially in the pre-dispute context, both sides 
have a vested interest in the perceived fairness of the arbitration process. 
Customized and well-regarded standards evolve when arbitration becomes the 
norm. 
The best approach, as the ALI Project concludes, is to craft a process that 
candidates and voters believe to be a fair forum to achieve a just electoral outcome. 
Over time, as states and negotiating parties improve standard agreements to 
arbitrate post-election disputes, one can imagine courts’ increasing confidence in 
the mechanism and concurrent reluctance to entertain related suits. 
 
D. Transparency 
 
In most arbitration disputes, as described above, confidentiality is an attractive 
feature. Arbitration provides parties with the ability to retain their reputation 
without airing the details of the dispute in open court. Litigants are often willing to 
forgo procedural fairness guarantees built into litigation for gains associated with a 
confidential process.  
In the context of ballot battles, confidentiality is most-assuredly not 
appropriate. Any sense that recounts or reexaminations of ballots are being 
conducted behind closed doors will drastically reduce the public’s willingness to 
accept the outcome. This truth has driven most states to require careful and 
structured public oversight of post-election ballot counting, and has compelled 
                                                 
77 JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISPUTES 171–78 (1997) (stating the Employment Protocol in Appendix B). Consumer Protocol and 
Healthcare Protocol models have also been developed. See generally Margaret M. Harding, The Limits 
of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369, 369 (2004). 
78  See AAA Court- and Time-Tested Rules and Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules;jsessionid=ICDhlUDMUQlD_xE6C2s7Dr-
WuXnPX7OJuamiMFeUI2g1DxCqEk-
p!2038387979?_afrLoop=141047276088379&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=bTrqQyl8#%40%
3F_afrWindowId%3DbTrqQyl8%26_afrLoop%3D141047276088379%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26
_adf.ctrl-state%3Da5k3c18ur_4 (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (“Since our founding, the AAA has been at 
the forefront of the development and refinement of the court-tested rules and procedures that are the 
bedrock of any successful alternative dispute resolution process. When used in conjunction with our 
neutrals and AAA-administered case management, they provide cost-effective and tangible value to 
users across a wide variety of industries and cases.”). 
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extraordinary efforts to include members of the public in the oversight process as 
well. For example, in the U.S. Senate recount in 2008, disputed ballots were live-
streamed over the Internet as election judges evaluated them.79  
In short, the more transparency mechanisms built into agreements to arbitrate 
ballot-counting disputes, the better. Courts and election administrators have been 
experimenting with ways that technology can dramatically increase opportunities 
for transparency in post-election processes. Because of the flexibility arbitration 
permits, arbitral forums could (and should) innovate to an even greater extent. 
 
E. Standards 
 
Arbitrating ballot-counting disputes holds benefit in the election context where 
standards applied can be outcome determinative. One has only to look at the 
Florida controversy of 2000, for example, where the standard of voter intent in 
marking a ballot had not been clearly enshrined prior to the election, to see how 
important standard setting can be.80 Advocates have long urged states to set clear 
standards in state election statutes. All too often, legislators neglect to fix problems 
with election mechanics once in office,81 or write statutes that fail to anticipate 
standards questions.  
Requiring parties to negotiate the precise standards and procedural rules that 
will govern a future ballot-counting dispute as part of an arbitration agreement 
would enable negotiators to design rules ahead of time to fill in whatever gaps 
statutes or regulations have left open. With no dispute on the table, negotiators will 
look for rules that are clear and simple to follow, reducing partisan posturing once 
election disputes are underway.82  
The process of negotiating standards could even serve the purpose of alerting 
the legislature of gaps in the code. As arbitral norms develop, legislatures could 
adopt standards candidates routinely include to in pre-election arbitration 
                                                 
79 FOLEY, supra note 2, at 320 (“[T]he [B]oard permitted its review of the challenged ballots to be 
televised over the Internet, with a screen that enabled citizens watching the proceedings to see each 
ballot that the board was evaluating. This transparency engendered public trust in the board’s rulings. 
Citizens could see for themselves that the board was reviewing each ballot deliberately and fairly.”). 
80 See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
81  HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS 
FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 8 (2009) (“As one reform advocate ruefully told me, ‘Process is not 
sexy.’”). Once elections are over and the legislative session begins, they are often “out of sight out of 
mind.” Id. The notable exception, of course, are issues like voter eligibility and redistricting where 
legislators’ stake arguably remains heavily in play throughout their terms. 
82 The Bush v. Gore standards battle provides a prime example of the partisan arguments over ballot 
counting standards once recounts are underway. See CHARLES L. ZELDON, BUSH V. GORE: 
EXPOSING THE HIDDEN CRISIS IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2008) at 19-26 (describing the 
standards battles Bush and Gore’s attorneys engaged in since Florida law fell silent on whether or not 
specific ballots should be counted); see also JAY WEINER, THIS IS NOT FLORIDA: HOW AL FRANKEN 
WON THE MINNESOTA SENATE RECOUNT, 91-3 (2010)(describing standards battles in the 2008 
Minnesota U.S. Senate recount). 
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agreements. In this way, negotiation over standards could help states develop 
uniform and non-partisan agreement on how to count ballots fairly. 
The discussion above suggests several ways in which arbitration holds the 
potential to improve ballot battle resolution. The section that follows looks at some 
potential criticism of the arbitration model in resolving post-election disputes. 
 
IV. CRITIQUES OF ARBITRATING BALLOT BATTLES 
 
Arbitration is hardly a darling of current public opinion. Its use in the consumer 
and employment contexts is under fire from many quarters. 83 Indeed, there are 
many reasons to question whether its injection into the voting process is wise. This 
section addresses several potential challenges to arbitrating ballot-counting 
disputes. 
One critique of arbitrating ballot disputes is the problem of precedent. A 
common criticism of arbitration generally is that non-judicial settlement of disputes 
deprives future litigants of the precedential value of outcomes. The law, the 
argument goes, cannot develop when disputes are resolved out of court.84 But just 
because precedent does not develop in many arbitral contexts does not mean it need 
be so here. As noted above, a critical feature of any contract to arbitrate ballot-
counting disputes must be that the process be done in public and that arbitral 
decisions be fully reasoned and documented. Arbitration does not require secrecy 
just because most arbitration contracts choose it. In fact, some of the most 
innovative arbitration schemes build openness of outcomes and even the use of 
precedents into the arbitral structure. For example, the Israeli “Benoam” arbitration 
model for resolving insurance subrogation claims relies on a series of published 
“landmark decisions” by arbitrators upon which future arbitrators rely in resolving 
subsequent claims.85 The beauty of arbitration, as described above, is its flexibility 
and capacity to bend to the specific needs of the dispute environment. 
Another potential hurdle to arbitrating ballot-counting disputes is whether or 
not, in the case of candidates for Congress, states have the authority to impose 
arbitration as a condition of ballot access. In United States Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, the Supreme Court held that states cannot impose additional 
qualifications for candidates for Congress beyond what the U.S. Constitution 
                                                 
83  See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 28. For a general critique of 
mandatory binding arbitration in the consumer and employment context, see generally Jean R. 
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005). 
84 Fiss, supra note 70, at 1085 (“[A court’s] job is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor 
simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts 
such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with 
them.”). 
85 Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, Technology and the Future of Dispute Systems Design, 
17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 151, 183–90 (2012) (describing the Benoam arbitration process and its 
incorporation of precedential outcomes into its structure). 
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requires. 86  In that case, the Court found unconstitutional a provision in the 
Arkansas state constitution that refused ballot access to individuals who had served 
either three terms in the U.S. House of Representatives or two terms in the U.S. 
Senate.87 The question of whether this case would preclude states from requiring 
congressional candidates to sign a contract to arbitrate ballot-counting disputes 
would thus depend on whether or not such a condition of access would be 
considered a “qualification.” Based on the Court’s reasoning in Term Limits, there 
is a strong argument that an arbitration condition is not a qualification. In that 
case, the Court’s concern was that allowing states to impose their own “patchwork” 
of qualifications for federal representatives would frustrate the Framer’s design of a 
uniform national legislature.88 Imposing an arbitration condition would not impact 
the uniformity of the federal body. Rather, such a condition would constitute the 
state simply requiring candidates to agree to its manner of election process—a 
power clearly delegated to states in Article I Section 4’s “Time, Place and Manner 
of Holding Elections” clause.89 
A final hurdle to arbitrating post-election disputes is the question of legitimacy 
of the arbitral forum. Would members of the public accept an arbitrated outcome? 
Would voters feel cheated out of their day in court? Would the arbitrated outcome 
be the subject of countless lawsuits decrying arbitrators’ decisions? Answers to these 
questions would most likely rest on whether or not the public perceived the process 
as fair and transparent. For this reason any agreement to arbitrate ballot-counting 
disputes must be comprehensive, transparent, and include process protections that 
ensure public buy-in.  Based on Professor Foley’s history of disputed election, there 
is every reason to believe the public will accept a non-traditional approach to 
resolving election disputes if the public believes fundamental fairness has been 
served. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This discussion comprises a thought experiment. Much more work would be 
required to flesh out what a model pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate ballot-
counting disputes might look like, who would negotiate and sign it, whether it 
would be subject to judicial review, what due process protections should be built in, 
and what procedures and remedies it would require.  
Should candidates, parties, and state governments start experimenting with this 
idea, one can imagine that contracting norms might evolve and agreements to 
                                                 
86 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 780 (1995) (concluding that “the Framers 
intended the Constitution to be the exclusive source of qualifications for Members of Congress, and that 
the Framers thereby ’divested’ States of any power to add qualifications”). 
87 Id. at 783. 
88 See id. at 780. 
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators 
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”). 
718 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 104 
 
 
arbitrate would take on increased legitimacy over time. What works well in one 
post-election dispute context might be refined and used in another, building 
towards arbitral norms that reduce uncertainty in post-election disputes.  
With the sweeping record of post-election disputes Professor Foley has 
compiled, we are hardly starting from scratch. We can use his careful history to 
learn lessons from the past about how to resolve ballot-counting disputes creatively 
and flexibly, prizing the legitimacy of the process as the foremost goal. 
 
